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1
INTEREST OF AMICI1
Amici are professors and researchers of intellectual
property law at universities throughout the United States.
We have no personal interest in the outcome of this case,
but a professional interest in seeing patent law develop
in a way that encourages innovation and creativity as
efficiently as possible.
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT
Petitioner argues that only a court – indeed, only a
jury – has the power to decide that the United States
Patent and Trademark Office erred in granting a patent.
That argument flies in the face of the history of patent
law and this Court’s precedents.
Patents are a creature of statute: as early as 1834, this
Court specifically recognized that there is no “natural” or
common law right to a patent. Rather, under its Article I
power to establish a patent system, Congress is charged
with determining the contours of the patent grant.
Congressional power to establish the terms and conditions
of the patent grant includes the power to establish a
system for administrative correction of erroneously
granted patents.
PTAB error correction is also narrow in scope,
targeted towards bad patents that district court litigation
1. No person other than the amici and their counsel
participated in the writing of this brief or made a financial
contribution to the brief. Letters signifying the parties’ consent
to the filing of this brief are on file with the Court.
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would not address, and only a modest extension of prior
administrative correction proceedings. Moreover, even
this narrow scope is subject to significant appellate court
control. PTAB review thus addresses the social cost of
erroneous patent grants without threatening Article III
values.
The Seventh Amendment does not compel a different
conclusion. While patent infringement cases were tried
to juries at common law, both the government and judges
retained the power to revoke patents in England and in
the early United States. When patent validity questions
were considered in American courts throughout history,
they were frequently considered by judges, not juries. And
court consideration of patent validity issues coexisted with
actions by the legislative and executive branches to revoke
patents, actions which of course did not require a jury.
While this Court need not reach the Seventh Amendment
issue in order to dispose of petitioner’s claims, should it
reach that issue it should make clear that the Seventh
Amendment does not create a right to jury trial on patent
validity.
ARGUMENT
I.

Under this Court’s Article III Precedent, Congress
Can Permit an Administrative Agency to Correct
Errors in Patent Rights that It Granted.

Despite “some debate” about the full scope of
permissible non-Article III adjudication, the Court has
confirmed that Congress may assign adjudication to expert
administrative agencies in “cases in which the claim at
issue derives from a federal regulatory scheme, or in which

3
resolution of the claim by an expert government agency is
deemed essential to a limited regulatory objective within
the agency’s authority.” Stern v. Marshall, 564 U.S. 462,
490 (2011). When “the right [at issue] is integrally related
to particular federal government action,” no constitutional
barrier exists to administrative adjudication. Id. at 490491.
Inter partes review is a quintessential example of
constitutionally-permissible administrative adjudication.
Patent rights are created by federal statute with no
common law analog. The precise question resolved is
whether the United States Patent and Trademark Office
erred in implementing Congress’s directives by granting a
patent that failed the statutory conditions of patentability.
The cancellation of invalid patents through inter partes
review thus is closely intertwined with, and essential to,
the Patent Office’s primary administrative function of
patent examination, allowing the Patent Office to correct
errors in its prior administrative process.
A.

Because Patent Rights Are Federal Statutory
Rights, Congress Has Power to Allow Error
Correction by the Agency that Granted Those
Rights.

American patent rights exist solely because of federal
statutes enacted by Congress pursuant to Article I.
“Under the common law the inventor had no right to
exclude others from making and using his invention.”
Deepsouth Packing Co. v. Laitram Corp., 406 U.S. 518,
525-526 (1972) (superseded by statute on other grounds);
see also Wheaton v. Peters, 33 U.S. 591, 661 (1834)
(concluding that inventors never had exclusive rights to
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inventions at common law “either in this country or in
England”).
The right to exclude others from using an invention
therefore “must be derived from [the] patent grant, and
thus from the patent statute.” Deepsouth, 406 U.S. at
526. As statutory rights created in Congress’s discretion,
Congress may “select[] the policy which in its judgment
best effectuates the constitutional aim” and “set out
conditions and tests for patentability.” Graham v. John
Deere Co., 383 U.S. 1, 6 (1966) (emphasis added); see also
Deepsouth, 406 U.S. at 530 (describing Constitution as
“permissive” for patent rights).
Post-issuance administrative error correction
and patent cancellation are among the conditions that
Congress can constitutionally impose on patent rights.
Congress has broad power to provide for administrative
adjudication when, as here, the right exists solely because
of a federal statute “and does not depend on or replace a
right . . . under state law.”2 Stern, 564 U.S. at 491 (quotation
omitted). Congress can permit Patent Office error
correction “before [a] particularized tribunal[] created to
perform the specialized adjudicative tasks related to that
right” as an “incidental extension[] of Congress’ power
to define rights that it has created.” Northern Pipeline
2. Patent rights are comparable to trademark registration,
which is strictly statutory, and distinctly different from “the
right to adopt and exclusively use a trademark,” which was a
pre-existing common law right. See B&B Hardware, Inc. v.
Hargis Indus., Inc., 135 S. Ct. 1293, 1317 (2015) (Thomas, J.,
dissenting) (concluding that “no one disputes that the TTAB may
constitutionally adjudicate a registration claim” because it is a
“quasi-private right”).
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Construction Co. v. Marathon Pipe Line Co., 458 U.S. 50,
83-84 (1982) (plurality); see also United States v. Duell,
172 U.S. 576, 583 (1899) (“Congress may provide such
instrumentalities in respect of securing to inventors the
exclusive right to their discoveries as in its judgment will
be best calculated to effect that object.”).
The Patent Act expressly defines the rights granted by
a patent as being “[s]ubject to the provisions of this title.”
35 U.S.C. § 261. For over thirty-five years, 3 “the provisions
of this title” have included Patent Office “authority to
reexamine — and perhaps cancel — a patent claim that
it had previously allowed.” Cuozzo Speed Techs., LLC v.
Lee, 136 S. Ct. 2131, 2137 (2016). Patents granted after
July 1, 1981 were issued subject to cancellation in ex parte
reexamination, and those granted between November 29,
1999 and September 16, 2012 were issued additionally
subject to inter partes reexamination. Id. Congress
“modifie[d]” reexamination by instituting inter partes
review on September 16, 2012, as the latest iteration of
its decades-long scheme for post-issuance Patent Office
error correction. Id.
As discussed in Part II, inter partes review is
significantly more streamlined than reexamination,
which helps to explain why inter partes review has been
more widely used to revoke invalid patents than prior
procedures. Despite these differences, inter partes
3. Even earlier, under the Patent Act of 1952, the Board of
Patent Appeals and Interferences’ decision in an interference
“constitute[d] cancellation of the claims involved from the patent,”
albeit only if the Patent Office erred by granting a patent to subject
matter that was first invented by another patent applicant. Patent
Act of 1952 § 135, P.L. 593, 66 Stat. 792, 802 (July 19, 1952).
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review imposes the same condition on the rights granted
by a patent that Congress has imposed on every patent
issued in the past thirty-five years: the possibility of
post-issuance administrative error review and patent
cancellation. “Although Congress changed the name from
‘reexamination’ to ‘review,’ nothing convinces us that, in
doing so, Congress wanted to change its basic purposes,
namely, to reexamine an earlier agency decision.” Id. at
2144.
Thus, the rights provided by virtually every patent
still in effect are subject to post-issuance Patent Office
review and cancellation. For that reason, arguments that
inter partes review impermissibly extinguishes “property
rights” through an administrative forum miss the point.
It is “the federal patent scheme [that] creates a limited
opportunity to obtain a property right in an idea.” Bonito
Boats, Inc. v. Thunder Craft Boats, Inc., 489 U.S. 141,
149 (1989). “[T]he Patent Act itself indicates that patents
shall have the attributes of personal property ‘[s]ubject to
the provisions of this title.’” eBay Inc. v. MercExchange,
LLC, 547 U.S. 388, 392 (2006) (quoting 35 U.S.C. § 261).
The possibility of Patent Office error correction and
cancellation is therefore part and parcel with the right
created by the patent grant, at least for patents granted
in the past 35 years.
Even traditional property rights are eligible for
non-Article III adjudication. Aspects of bankruptcy that
are indisputably subject to non-Article III adjudication
involve property rights. See, e.g., Wellness Int’l Network,
Ltd. v. Sharif, 135 S. Ct. 1932, 1952-54 (2015) (Roberts,
C.J., dissenting). The Court likewise characterized its
opinion in Block v. Hirsh, 256 U.S. 135 (1921), which
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involved administrative adjudication of landlords’ right to
possession and rental amounts from holdover tenants, as
involving rights capable of non-Article III adjudication.
See Thomas v. Union Carbide Agricultural Prods. Co.,
473 U.S. 568, 588-589 (1985). And this is particularly
true of legal interests, like patent rights, that exist solely
because they were created by administrative agencies in
the course of implementing a statutory mandate. Thus,
even if this Court were to find that inter partes review is
qualitatively different from prior procedures in a way that
changed the nature of the rights granted, such a finding
would not implicate Article III.
B. PTAB Error Correction Is Integrally Related
to the Patent Office’s Primary Administrative
Role of Examining and Granting Valid Patents.
The Patent Office’s primary administrative role is to
protect the public interest served by the patent grant.
Motion Picture Patents Co. v. Universal Film Mfg. Co.,
243 U.S. 502, 511 (1917); see also Blonder-Tongue Labs.,
Inc. v. Univ. of Ill. Foundation, 402 U.S. 313, 343 (1971)
(“A patent by its very nature is affected with a public
interest.” (quotation omitted)). Specifically, “this court has
consistently held that the primary purpose of our patent
law is not the creation of private fortunes for the owners
of patents but is ‘to promote the progress of science and
the useful arts.’” Motion Picture Patents, 243 U.S. at 511
(quoting U.S. Const., Art. I, § 8).
The patent statutes enacted by Congress, and the
patent rights they create, reflect the need to strike a
“careful balance” between the benefits from incentivizing
innovation and the costs imposed by exclusive rights
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that can stifle both competition and further innovation.
Bonito Boats, 489 U.S. at 146; see also Kimble v. Marvel
Entertainment, LLC, 135 S. Ct. 2401, 2406-07 (2015). In
particular, the patentability requirements of novelty and
non-obviousness (the potential grounds for inter partes
review) reflect Congress’s judgment that exclusive rights
in information that is already publicly available or can
be easily determined from publicly available information
“would not only serve no socially useful purpose, but would
in fact injure the public by removing existing knowledge
from public use.” Bonito Boats, 489 U.S. at 148, 150.
It is “as important to the public that competition
should not be repressed by worthless patents, as that the
patentee of a really valuable invention should be protected
in his monopoly.” Pope Mfg. Co. v. Gormully, 144 U.S. 224,
234 (1892). The Court’s conclusion in Lear, Inc. v. Adkins
that state law could not bar a licensee from challenging
the validity of the licensed patent reflected an affirmative
policy judgment that invalidating weak patents served
“the important public interest in permitting full and free
competition in the use of ideas which are in reality a part
of the public domain.” 395 U.S. 653, 670-671 (1969); see
also Blonder-Tongue, 402 U.S. at 344 (noting that this
Court’s decisions have long “encourage[d] authoritative
testing of patent validity”).
The Patent Office has primary responsibility for
insuring only warranted patents issue. “Congress has
charged the United States Patent and Trademark Office
(PTO) with the task of examining patent applications,”
and granting patents only if the patent applications satisfy
“the prerequisites for issuance of a patent” set forth by
Congress to balance the needs of innovation with the needs
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of public accessibility and competition. See Microsoft Corp.
v. i4i Ltd. Partnership, 564 U.S. 91, 95-96 (2011). The
Patent Office “has special expertise in evaluating patent
applications” for compliance with these patentability
requirements. Kappos v. Hyatt, 566 U.S. 431, 445 (2012).
An invalidity challenge – whether in litigation or in
inter partes review – is an “attempt to prove that the
patent never should have issued in the first place” and
therefore is integrally related to the expert Patent Office’s
primary examination function. See Microsoft, 564 U.S. at
96. In fact, the litigation presumption of validity exists to
reflect deference to the expert Patent Office’s considered
judgment, not to protect the patentee or because patents
are property rights. See id. at 97, 110-112.
Just two terms ago, in Cuozzo, the unanimous Court
indicated that inter partes review is integrally related
to particular federal government action – to allow nonArticle III adjudication under Stern – because its very
purpose is “to reexamine an earlier agency decision.” 136
S. Ct. at 2144. The Court refused to characterize inter
partes review as a surrogate for district court litigation
because it has characteristics of a “specialized agency
proceeding” that “offer[s] a second look at an earlier
administrative grant of a patent.” Id. at 2143-44. By
doing so, inter partes review provides an essential tool
for the Patent Office’s primary administrative objective
of “protect[ing] the public’s paramount interest in seeing
that patent monopolies are kept within their legitimate
scope.” Id. at 2144 (quotations and alterations omitted).
In sum, inter partes review allows the Patent Office
to correct errors arising from its primary statutory duty
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of examining patent applications for compliance with
the patentability requirements to determine whether
exclusive rights should be granted – rights that exist solely
by Congressional statute with no roots in the common
law. Inter partes review is a prototypical example of
permissible administrative adjudication under this Court’s
Article III precedent.
C.

Congress’s Discretion to Assign Patent Error
Correction to the Patent Office Is Not Limited
by the Fora for Patent Cancellation in 1789.

Oil States, and several amici, ask this Court to create
a new Article III test that would limit Congress’s power to
provide for adjudication of federal statutory patent rights
to the historical fora for patent cancellation available in
1789. This argument misunderstands both this Court’s
Article III precedent and the historical practice regarding
patent cancellation.
1. A historical practice of non-judicial adjudication
at the time of the Constitution can support non-Article
III adjudication today. Wellness, 135 S. Ct. at 1951
(Roberts, C.J., dissenting). But this Court’s precedent
does not support a categorical requirement that all issues
resolved in courts in 1789 must be resolved in Article
III courts today. See Granfinanciera S.A. v Nordberg,
492 U.S. 33, 42 (1989) (instructing that whether nonArticle III adjudication is permissible should be decided
after determining whether the claim would have been
decided in law courts in 1789); see also Murray’s Lessee
v. Hoboken Land & Improvement Co., 59 U.S. 272, 282
(1855) (describing as “an unwarrantable assumption”
the conclusion that Article III adjudication was required
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because the issues were “settled in what was denominated
the court of exchequer” in England).
T h is Cou r t ha s ex pressed skept icism about
Congressional efforts to withdraw from Article III courts
“any matter which, from its nature, is the subject of a suit
at the common law, or in equity, or admiralty” or “is made
of the stuff of the traditional actions at common law tried
by the courts at Westminster in 1789.” Stern, 564 U.S. at
484 (quotations omitted); see also, e.g., Wellness, 135 S. Ct.
at 1938. But the Court’s concern has been the source of
the right, not the forum of adjudication, at the time of the
Constitution. In particular, the Court has been troubled
when Congress assigns a traditional common law right to a
non-Article III tribunal for adjudication, either directly or
by replacing the common law right with a statutory right.
See Stern, 564 U.S. at 493-494 (state common law claims);
Granfinanciera, 492 U.S. at 60 (statutory replacement
of “a preexisting, common-law cause of action”); see also
Wellness, 135 S. Ct. at 1951 (Roberts, C.J., dissenting)
(rejecting non-Article III adjudication of claims that
arose “from independent common law sources”). Because
common law rights were created by, not just adjudicated
in, courts, adjudication of common law rights is “the most
prototypical exercise of judicial power.” Stern, 564 U.S.
at 494.
By contrast, the Court has looked favorably on nonArticle III adjudication of federal statutory rights like
patent rights that neither existed in the common law
nor replaced a common law right. Stern, 564 U.S. at 491
(“This Court held that the scheme did not violate Article
III, explaining that ‘[a]ny right to compensation ... results
from [the statute] and does not depend on or replace a
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right to such compensation under state law.’” (quoting
Thomas, 473 U.S. at 584)).4 Unlike common law rights,
federal statutory rights exist as an exercise of legislative,
not judicial power, and therefore Congress has significant
power to define the mode for adjudication of those rights.
Northern Pipeline, 458 U.S. at 83 n.35 (plurality). This
was equally true for the limited statutory rights that
existed in the 18th century. See John F. Preis, How the
Federal Cause of Action Relates to Rights, Remedies,
and Jurisdiction, 67 Fla. L. Rev. 849, 866 (2015) (noting
that Parliament in the 18th century sometimes specified
means for statutory rights to be enforced). That patent
validity may sometimes have been litigated in courts in
1789 was the result of legislative (or royal), not judicial,
power. Thus, non-Article III cancellation of issued patents
– rights that derive solely from federal statute – may have
“incidental” effects on the exercise of judicial power but
does not threaten the core judicial power protected by
Article III. Northern Pipeline, 458 U.S. at 83 (plurality).
2. Even assuming arguendo a historical test that
ignored this Court’s emphasis on whether the right at
issue is a federal statutory right, patent cancellation
4. See also Murray’s Lessee, 59 U.S. at 284 (non-Article III
adjudication permissible when a right “depends upon the will of
congress whether a remedy in the courts shall be allowed at all”);
Northern Pipeline, 458 U.S. at 83 (plurality) (permitting Congress
to assign “specialized adjudicative tasks” to “particularized
tribunals” for rights it creates); id. at 90 (Rehnquist, J., concurring
in the judgment) (rejecting non-Article adjudication because there
was “no federal rule of decision provided for any of the issues in the
lawsuit”); Wellness, 135 S. Ct. at 1951 (Roberts, C.J., dissenting)
(identifying “Congress’s constitutional authority to enact
bankruptcy laws” as supporting non-Article III adjudication).
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was not so exclusively tied to the courts in 1789 as to
require Article III adjudication. Patents in England in
the eighteenth century were a royal grant of prerogative
from the sovereign. While patents were enforced in
common law courts, historically only the Crown (through
the Privy Council) could revoke or annul a patent. See
Sean Bottomley, Patent Cases in the Court of Chancery,
1714–58, 35 J. Leg. Hist. 27, 27-28, 34 & n.48 (2014).
Indeed, until 1753 the Privy Council was the only means
by which a patent could be revoked. See, e.g., Christine
M acLeod, Inventing the Industrial Revolution: The
English Patent S ystem , 1660–1800, at 19 (1988); E.
Wyndham Hulme, Privy Council Law and Practice of
Letters Patent for Invention from the Restoration to 1794,
33 L.Q. Rev. 63, 189-191, 193-194 (1917) (concluding that
the Privy Council had primary jurisdiction over patent law
until 1753 and continued to have concurrent jurisdiction
thereafter).
In 1753, the Council granted the courts concurrent
jurisdiction with the Council itself to revoke a patent. As
discussed further in Part III, in the late 1700s, litigants
increasingly employed the writ of scire facias rather
than turning to the Privy Council. Even so, the Privy
Council revoked a patent in 1774 and another one in 1779,
a mere ten years before the Constitution, with additional
revocation proceedings requested but not acted upon in
1782 and 1794. Hulme, supra, 33 L. Q. Rev. at 192-193.
The English patent grant remained expressly conditioned
on Privy Council revocation well into the 19th century.
Oren Bracha, Owning Ideas: A History of Anglo-American
Intellectual Property 60-61 & n.129 (June 2005), https://
law.utexas.edu/faculty/obracha/dissertation/. The Privy
Council considered a revocation claim in 1810, saying
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that “[i]f the danger to the Public has been very pressing
and imminent, we should have advised a Revocation of
the Patent without the delay of a Scire facias . . .” Board
of Ordnance v. Parr, PCi/3919 (Privy Council July 19,
1810). And the revocation clause was carried through
into the British Patents Acts of 1852 and 1902. William
M arten, The English Patent System (1904) (“By this
Act the Privy Council is empowered to revoke a patent
in the event of an existing industry or the establishment
of a new industry being unfairly prejudiced.”).
While some briefs point out that patent challengers
made more use of scire facias than the Privy Council by
the end of the 18th century, that is not the question. The
constitutional claim in this case is that the government
can never revoke a patent without the participation of a
court. Evidence that courts were usually but not always
involved in revoking patents doesn’t demonstrate that
claim. Indeed, it demonstrates the opposite.
Early American practice confirms the role of nonArticle III tribunals in patent validity determinations.
Because the United States had no king, Congress (or state
legislatures) took it upon themselves to revoke patents.
See, e.g., H.R. Journal, 3rd Cong., 1st Sess., 206 (1794)
(reporting petition by Jonathan Jenkins requesting repeal
of patent granted to Benjamin Folger for using whale oil
to produce candles); Livingston v. Van Ingen, 9 Johns 507,
508–09 (N.Y. 1812) (litigating the consequences of New
York’s revocation of the 1787 patent to John Fitch for the
steamboat and a subsequent grant to Robert Livingston,
with both parties assuming the legislature could revoke
the patent it granted); Bracha, supra, at 110-11 (noting
that state legislatures universally assumed this power).

15
Thus, even if this Court were to adopt a novel
historical test for Article III that focused on the forum
in which actions were brought in 1789, patent cancellation
was not exclusively a function of the courts at that time.
Since the middle of the 20th century, Congress again
has exercised significant control over patent cancellation
by permitting administrative cancellation, first in
interferences starting in 1952, then in reexamination
beginning in 1981, and now in inter partes review.
Congress acted within its legitimate legislative power in
doing so, even if its choices differed from those of early
Congresses. The Court long ago recognized in the context
of interferences, which could involve issued patents, that
statutory entitlement to patent rights was a “matter[]
involving public rights, which may be presented in such
form that the judicial power is capable of acting on them,
and which are susceptible of judicial determination,
but which Congress may or may not bring within the
cognizance of the courts of the United States, as it
may deem proper.” Duell, 172 U.S. at 582-583 (quoting
Murray’s Lessee, 59 U.S. at 284 (emphasis added)); see
also Christopher Beauchamp, Repealing Patents 32-33
(working paper, available at https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/
papers.cfm?abstract_id=3044003) (suggesting that the
history of patent revocation under the 1790 and 1793 acts
suggests that Congress may have considered patents to
be public rights). The grounds for inter partes review
and its impact may be greater but the basic conclusion
remains: as federal statutory rights that do not replace
any common law rights, Congress has broad power to
provide for administrative adjudication of the validity of
issued patents.
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II. Congress Adopted an Administrative Error
Correction Scheme That Promotes Article I
Objectives Without Threatening Article III
Principles
A.

Congress Has Repeatedly Determined That
Administrative Correction of Erroneously
Granted Patents Is Necessary to Promote the
“Progress of the Useful Arts”

In assessing the Constitutionality of tribunals
outside Article III, this Court has looked to whether
the tribunal “ensure[s] the effectiveness” of a system
Congress established pursuant to its Article I powers.
CFTC v. Schor, 478 U.S. 833, 856 (1986). In this case,
Congress has, since 1980, done precisely what the Court
has required. It has set up administrative proceedings
specifically to ensure that patents are kept “within their
legitimate scope,” Cuozzo, 136 S. Ct. at 2144 (quotations
omitted), so that the patent system can properly serve its
Constitutional purpose of promoting the “Progress of the
Useful Arts.” These proceedings involve “a specific and
limited regulatory scheme” as to which the agency has
“obvious expertise.” Stern v. Marshall, 564 U.S. 462, 491
(2011) (internal citations omitted).
As Congress has appreciated, the U.S. Patent and
Trademark Office operates under tremendous workload
pressure. In 2016, for example, the office received over
650,000 patent applications and allowed over 360,000
patents. USPTO Report FY 2016, at 178. Such highthroughput processing will inevitably produce error.
Erroneous determinations of novelty and non-obviousness
– the precise areas covered by inter partes review – are
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particularly likely. The applicant has no duty to search the
scientific and technical literature; instead, the examiner
bears the time-intensive burden of finding literature to
show a given application claims invention that is not novel
or is obvious. Moreover, while applicants have obvious
incentives to appeal an examiner’s erroneous decision
to deny a patent, the initial examination process affords
little opportunity for third-party input and no mechanism
for thwarting an erroneous grant. Additionally, the sheer
volume of annual applications and grants, and substantial
uncertainty regarding which patents will ultimately be
asserted against competitors, limit the ability of third
party competitors to monitor the Patent Office’s initial
examination processes.
The monitoring problem is more tractable for that
subset of patents that are ultimately asserted against
competitors. However, many improperly granted patents
will not be invalidated through expensive and protracted
district court litigation. The 2017 economic survey of
the American Intellectual Property Law Association
indicates that even for the lowest-stakes category of patent
lawsuits (in which less than $1 million is at risk), median
litigation costs are $500,000. And for the highest-stakes
lawsuits (in which more than $25 million is at risk), median
litigation costs rise to over $3 million. Given these costs,
defendants charged with infringement of an erroneously
granted patent may simply settle the case, thereby failing
to engage in the “authoritative testing of patent validity”
that this Court has seen as essential. See Blonder-Tongue,
402 U.S. at 344. 5
5. Indeed, settlement may be particularly likely in cases
where an improperly granted patent can be asserted against
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As discussed in Part I, Congress has for many
decades provided for administrative cancellation of
patent claims post-issuance. In doing so, Congress both
intended to settle validity disputes “more quickly and less
expensively than the often protracted litigation involved
in such cases” and to “reinforce investor confidence in
the certainty of patent rights by affording the USPTO a
broader opportunity to review doubtful patents.” Patlex
Corp. v. Mossinghoff, 758 F.2d 594, 602 (Fed. Cir. 1985)
(quotations omitted).
Ex parte reexamination, which began for patents
granted in 1981 (and continues in force today), has the
drawback of excluding third-party participation beyond
the initial request. In 1999, Congress therefore created a
new procedure to expand third-party participation, inter
partes reexamination. As with ex parte examination,
Congress intended inter partes reexamination to target
“bad” patents. See Microsoft, 564 U.S. at 113 (“Congress
has amended the patent laws to account for concerns about
‘bad’ patents, including by expanding the reexamination
process to provide for inter partes proceedings.”).
Unfortunately, the initial structure of inter partes
reexamination was an unwieldy, two-step process with
no time limits. The initial reexamination itself took an
many defendants and thereby imposes very significant social costs.
In those cases, the firm that expends resources to successfully
invalidate the patent cannot capture that value, as it invalidates
the patent not only for itself but for all of its competitors. See, e.g.,
Joseph Farrell & Robert P. Merges, Incentives to Challenge and
Defend Patents: Why Litigation Won’t Reliably Fix Patent Office
Errors and Why Administrative Patent Review Might Help, 19
Berkeley Tech. L.J. 943 (2004).
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average of 39.5 months, and the result then had to be
appealed to the Board of Patent Appeals and Interferences
(“BPAI”). See Saurabh Vishnubhakat, Arti Rai, and Jay
Kesan, Strategic Decision Making in Dual PTAB and
District Court Proceedings, 31 Berkeley Tech. L.J. 45,
58 (2016). As a consequence, inter partes reexamination
was never widely used. Id.
Inter partes review keeps the substantive rules of
inter partes reexamination but eliminates the two-step
process of the earlier statute. It renames and expands
the BPAI into a body, the PTAB, that directly hears inter
partes petitions by third-party challengers and must make
a final written decision on granted petitions within one
year. Cuozzo, 136 S. Ct. at 2137; 35 U.S.C. § 316(a)(11). Like
BPAI judges before them, PTAB administrative judges
are statutorily required to possess not only “competent
legal knowledge” but also “scientific ability.” 35 U.S.C.
§ 6(a). Because administrative judges now operate at the
first step of review, inter partes review has some trialtype adjudicatory procedures that its predecessor lacked.
Cuozzo, 136 S. Ct. at 2143. As this Court unanimously
recognized in Cuozzo, however, inter partes review retains
many features of a “specialized agency proceeding.” Id.
at 2144. As noted, all PTAB judges are scientifically
trained. Additionally, third party petitioners need not have
constitutional standing; the Patent Office may continue
to conduct inter partes review even after the adverse
party has settled; and the Patent Office may intervene
in a later judicial proceeding to defend its decision even
after the private challenger has dropped out. Id. And as
with reexamination, the Congressional scheme for inter
partes review specifically provides for amendment of
patent claims. 35 U.S.C. § 316(d). Amending claims is a

20
uniquely administrative task in which Article III courts
cannot engage.
Not surprisingly, then, inter partes review only
overlaps to some extent with Article III adjudication.
In the period between September 16, 2012 and June 30,
2015, for example, 30% of inter partes review petitions
challenging patents were brought by entities that had
not previously been sued on that patent in district court.
Vishnubhakat, Rai, and Kesan, supra, at 64.
B. Error Correction Remains Under the Control
of Article III Courts
In assessing the compatibility of administrative
schemes with Article III values, this Court has looked
to the degree of Article III control for which the scheme
provides. See, e.g., Schor, 478 U.S. at 853. In this case,
Article III judges at both the appellate and district court
level retain significant power.
As with prior review mechanisms, the Congressional
scheme for inter partes review provides that all final
decisions of the PTAB are subject to appellate review by
an Article III court. 35 U.S.C. § 319. Notably, the Federal
Circuit reviews de novo all legal determinations made by
judges in PTAB proceedings. See Merck & Cie v. Gnosis
SpA, 808 F. 3d 829, 833 (Fed. Cir. 2015).
Although petitioner and its amici suggest that PTAB
administrative judges are insufficiently insulated from
the agency’s political influence, it bears emphasis that
PTAB administrative judges, and the Patent Office more
generally, exercise substantially less power through
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inter partes review than judges, and agencies, in many
other parts of the administrative state. While many other
administrative judges and agencies make case-by-case
legal determinations that this Court has held are entitled
to Chevron deference, see United States v. Mead Corp.,
533 U.S. 218, 230 n.12 (2001) (giving examples in which
this Court gave Chevron deference to determinations
made by agencies in individual adjudications), the legal
determinations the Patent Office makes in inter partes
review proceedings have not received Chevron deference.
In fact, Article III review in appeals from inter partes
review proceedings is more intensive than Article III
review of other Patent Office actions. In the context
of patent grants, for example, Article III judges must
show enormous deference to the Patent Office – courts
can overturn a patent grant only if they find clear and
convincing evidence of invalidity. See generally Microsoft
v. i4i, 564 U.S. 91 (2011).
PTAB review also intrudes only minimally on the
powers of district courts. Although district courts may
choose to stay proceedings in cases where an inter partes
petition is filed on a patent asserted in the proceeding,
district court discretion on whether or not to stay is
broad under inter partes review. As with predecessor
reexamination procedures, the inter partes review statute
contains no language constraining district court discretion
on whether to grant stays. The test for deciding whether
to stay varies by jurisdiction, including such factors
as the state of discovery; the timing of trial; potential
simplification of issues; and prejudice to the patentee. See,
e.g, Drink Tanks Corp. v. Growlerworks, Inc., No. 3:16-cv410-SI, 2016 WL 3844209, at *2 (D. Or. July 15, 2016).
This variation, and empirical data showing significant
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variations in rates of stay, see Paul R. Gugliuzza, (In)
Valid Patents, 92 Notre Dame L. Rev. 271, 286-287 (2016),
confirm the power retained by Article III courts.
Additionally, once a patent owner has filed a district
court patent infringement action, the defendant in the
action typically has only one year in which to bring a
petition for inter partes review. 35 U.S.C. § 315(b). And
unlike district court judges, PTAB judges can entertain
only a small subset of validity challenges – those based
on written prior art. 35 U.S.C. § 311(b). Thus, contrary
to the petitioner’s contention, Article III courts retain
power over much more than a “right to appeal.” Brief for
Petitioner at 42.
As this Court has noted, retention of control by
Article III courts protects not only separation of powers
but also individual liberty interests. See Stern, 564 U.S.
at 483. More generally, no provision of the inter partes
review scheme prevents patent owners from filing patent
infringement suits in Article III courts. The only entities
that are denied access to Article III courts are challengers
that first file an inter partes review petition and then
decide to seek a declaratory judgment of invalidity in
an Article III court. In that case, the civil action is
automatically stayed. 35 U.S.C. § 315(a)(2).
C.

Pe t i t i o n e r ’s F a c i a l C h a l l e n g e t o
Constitutionality Would Moot Efforts to
Improve Administrative Error Correction

The fact that certain Patent Off ice practices
implementing administrative review may raise concerns,
see, e.g., Brief of Petitioner at 45-46, is not the issue in this
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case. Indeed, petitioner’s sweeping facial challenge would
entirely moot ongoing and future efforts by the Patent
Office, the Federal Circuit, and Congress to improve
post-grant administrative review.
Petitioner and its supporting amici variously challenge
expansion of PTAB panels to achieve decisional uniformity;
the alleged reluctance of the PTAB to allow amendments
to patent claims; and certain Federal Circuit decisions that
have held that administrative cancellation of a patent can
occur after an Article III court has determined that the
patent is not invalid. These issues are all orthogonal to
the question of whether the scheme of inter partes review
enacted by Congress violates Article III. Instead, they are
rightly the focus of ongoing efforts at improvement within
the Patent Office, in Congress, see, e.g., STRONGER
Patents Act, and at the Federal Circuit. Petitioner’s goal of
denying Congress any ability to implement administrative
error correction would eviscerate ongoing and future
efforts to improve correction procedures.
III. The Absence of a Seventh Amendment Right
to Have a Jury Resolve Validity Confirms the
Constitutionality of PTAB Adjudication of Some
Patent Validity Determinations.
The Seventh Amendment does not compel a different
conclusion.
A.

The Seventh Amendment Does Not Preclude
Agency Proceedings

The right to a jury trial varies depending on the forum
Congress chooses for adjudication. If Congress provides
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for adjudication of a statutory right in the federal district
courts, the nature of the right will determine whether a
jury is required. “[A] jury trial must be available if the
action involves rights and remedies of the sort typically
enforced in an action at law.” Curtis v. Loether, 415
U.S. 189, 195 (1974). But if Congress can provide for
administrative adjudication of a statutory right like patent
rights consistent with the Constitution (the Article III
question addressed above), it can do so “free from the
strictures of the Seventh Amendment.” Id. at 194-95; see
also Granfinanciera, 492 U.S. at 42 n.4; Atlas Roofing Co.
v. OSHRC, 430 U.S. 442, 455 (1977). For that reason, even if
the Seventh Amendment requires a jury trial when patent
validity is raised in district court infringement litigation,
that does not mean that the Seventh Amendment requires
a jury trial when patent validity is raised in administrative
proceedings like Patent Office post-issuance review.
Indeed, the Administrative Procedure Act, 5 U.S.C.
§§ 551–559 (2006), presupposes that a judge, not a jury,
is reviewing the agency decision. Outside of the criminal
context, juries are not usually required to pass on agency
decisions. It is judges, not juries, who traditionally review
the decisions of administrative agencies.
Shortly after the passage of the APA, the Supreme
Court held that even in a criminal proceeding there is no
right to a jury trial to review an administrative agency
decision. Cox v. United States, 332 U.S. 442, 453 (1947). In
Cox, the defendants were convicted of leaving a wartime
civilian labor camp, to which they had been sent after
objecting to military service during World War II. The
Selective Service Board had classed them as conscientious
objectors; the defendants argued that they should have
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been classed instead as ministers of religion exempt
from civilian service. The statute in question made the
Board’s decision final on the classification issue. But the
defendants argued that they had the right to present the
misclassification argument to the jury. The Court rejected
that argument in sweeping terms:
The concept of a jury passing independently
on an issue previously determined by an
administrative body or reviewing the action
of an administrative body is contrary to
settled federal administrative practice; the
constitutional right to jury trial does not include
the right to have a jury pass on the validity of
an administrative order.
Id. at 453.
In sum, there is no need for this Court to reach the
Seventh Amendment historical issue at all if it concludes,
as it should, that Congress can vest the very government
that creates a patent with the power to review that patent.
B. Historical Practice Confirms That a Jury Is
Not Required to Adjudicate Validity
Even were this Court to apply a historical test for the
Seventh Amendment rather than focus on the nature of the
underlying right, English and American history confirm
that there is no right to have a jury determine patent
validity that precludes the government from revoking a
patent on its own authority.

26
1. In Markman v. Westview Instruments, Inc., 517
U.S. 370 (1996), the issue was whether the construction of
patent claims, which determines the scope of the patent,
was an issue for the judge or the jury. The Court began
by observing that “there is no dispute that infringement
cases today must be tried to a jury, as their predecessors
were more than two centuries ago.” Id. at 377 (emphasis
added). But that did not resolve the question before the
Court. Rather, it led to a second question:
[W]hether a particular issue occurring within
a jury trial (here the construction of a patent
claim) is itself necessarily a jury issue, the
guarantee being essential to preserve the right
to a jury’s resolution of the ultimate dispute. . . .
. . . [T]he answer to the second question “must
depend on whether the jury must shoulder this
responsibility as necessary to preserve the
‘substance of the common-law right of trial
by jury. “‘“Only those incidents which are
regarded as fundamental, as inherent in and of
the essence of the system of trial by jury, are
placed beyond the reach of the legislature.””
Id. at 377–78 (quoting Tull v. United States, 481 U.S. 412,
426 (1987)).
So even if infringement and damages are tried to a jury,
it doesn’t follow under Markman that all issues must be
tried to the jury. Rather, the question is whether those
particular issues were tried to a jury at old English
common law, and, even if so, whether the jury’s resolution
of those issues is so central to the common law right that
it must be preserved.
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2. As discussed in Part I, while juries considered
patent infringement suits, historically only the Privy
Council could revoke a patent. In 1753, the Council granted
the courts concurrent jurisdiction with the government
itself to revoke a patent. Under this post-1753 procedure, a
party that wanted to revoke a patent proceeded by a writ
of “scire facias.” The Chancery court could issue a writ of
scire facias, requiring the owner of the patent to appear
in court and defend the patent, lest the court issue an
order to the Crown revoking the patent for inconveniency.
Scire facias was the only judicial means of revoking a
patent. Hindmarch, A Treatise on the Law Relative to
Patent Privileges for the Sole Use of Inventions: And the
Practice of Obtaining Letters Patent for Inventions 3
(Harrisburg, Pa., I.G. M’Kinley & J.M.G. Lescure 1847)
(“The only means which the law provides for the repealing
of letters patent, is by action of scire facias at the suit of
the Queen.”); Attorney Gen. ex rel. Hecker v. Rumford
Chem. Works, 32 F. 608, 619 (C.C.R.I. 1876) (“No instance
can be found, it is believed, of any other proceeding in
England than a scire facias to repeal letters patent for
an invention.”).
Because the Crown granted the patent in the first
instance, it was thought to have an interest in the
proceeding, and so the Attorney General was a party and
had to approve the proceeding. William Hands, The Law
and Practice of Patents for Inventions 16 (London, W.
Clarke & Sons 1808) (“[A] writ of scire facias . . . issues
out of the Court of Chancery, at the instance of any private
person, but in the name of the King, leave to issue it
must therefore be previously obtained from the Attorney
General.”).
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It was the Chancellor, not the jury, who held the
final power to revoke a patent using scire facias. While
chancery courts could and did refer validity questions
to juries at common law, they did so only when there
was a disputed issue of fact that was necessary to the
resolution of the validity issue. They decided legal issues
for themselves.6 And the question of invalidity was not
itself a question of fact. See Hill v. Thompson, (1817) 36
Eng. Rep. 239 (Ch.) 242; 3 Mer. 622, 630; Mark A. Lemley,
Why Do Juries Decide If Patents Are Valid?, 99 Va. L.
Rev. 1673, 1690 (2013) (discussing cases).
A brief filed in this Court by two legal historians
argues that previously undiscovered unpublished
decisions during this period show that scire facias actions
were more common during the late eighteenth century
than previously thought and also show a common practice
of referring fact questions in those cases to juries. They
argue at various points based on this evidence that this
Court, the Federal Circuit, current scholars, and even
contemporary luminaries such as Lord Coke have all
misunderstood the role of scire facias. But even accepting
these unpublished cases and everything these two scholars
claim for them can offer no comfort to Petitioners here.
At most they establish that when a writ of scire facias
was brought in Chancery court and the resolution of the
6. 2 William Tidd, The Practice of the Court of King’s Bench
799 (2d ed. London 1799) (“it has become the practice for the jury,
when they have any doubt as to the matter of law, to find a special
verdict, stating the facts, and referring the law arising thereon to
the decision of the court; by concluding conditionally, that if upon
the whole matter alledged [sic], the court shall be of opinion, that
the plaintiff had cause of action, then they find for the plaintiff; if
otherwise, then for the defendant.”) (emphasis in original).
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writ turned on a disputed issue of fact it was common
(though not universal) practice to refer that fact issue to a
jury.7 But it is undisputed that the government itself had
and exercised the power to cancel a patent in the Privy
Council, and that the scire facias action was one that had
to be brought in the name of the government and with the
permission of the Attorney General.
The Seventh Amendment question is not whether
juries were used in patent cases at the founding but
whether there was a right to a jury trial on validity at
English common law that was so central that it could not be
decided without a jury. The power of the Privy Council to
cancel patents on its own, the fact that any court challenge
required the permission of the Attorney General, and the
limitation of the jury to deciding specific fact questions in
the case before them rather than holding a patent invalid
all demonstrate that the jury was at the very least not the
only way to invalidate a patent in England. To conclude
not only that the government did not have to be involved in
canceling a patent but that the government had no power
to do so would turn English history on its head.

7. The jury was not asked to annul the patent itself. Indeed,
the general practice in England at the time was to ask a jury to rule
only on specific factual questions. Thus, In Arkwright v. Nightingale,
Lord Loughborough’s charge to the jury was “simply whether you
believe five witnesses who have sworn to a positive fact.” Helen
Gubby, Developing a Legal Paradigm for Patents 197 (2012). The
jury would often answer those questions during the trial itself rather
than waiting to render a verdict after all the evidence was in. Id. at
29-30. One scholar suggests this sort of specific question was common
English practice at the time. James Oldham, English Common Law
in the Age of Mansfield 68 (2004).
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3. The Patent Acts of 1790 and 1793 also provided for
a petition to cancel a patent within the first years after the
patent was issued. ; Lemley, supra, at 1693, 1696. Those
actions were brought by private complainants. Ex Parte
Wood & Brundage, 22 U.S. (9 Wheat.) 603, 614 (1824).
But those private actions coexisted with the ability of the
government to revoke a patent. Morris v. Huntington,
17 F. Cas. 818, 821 (C.C.D.N.Y. 1824) (No. 9,831) (“I see
no insuperable objection to entering a vacatur of the
patent of record in the department of state, if taken out
inadvertently and by mistake”). One scholar rejects the
conclusion that those cancelation petitions enacted a scire
facias action, instead viewing them as new procedures
created by Congress. Beauchamp, supra.
As in England, juries could and did consider factual
questions in validity disputes when they were presented
as defenses to an infringement suit filed at law. But those
proceedings did not revoke or “invalidate” patents as we
understand the concept today. The successful assertion of
such a defense benefitted only the defendant, and did not
revoke the patent. Indeed, a number of early U.S. cases
involved juries reaching contradictory decisions on patent
validity. See, e.g., Blake v. Smith, 3 F. Cas. 604, 605–07
(C.C.S.D.N.Y. 1845) (No. 1,502) (noting that a jury in New
York had overturned a patent that a jury in Connecticut
had upheld, Blake v. Sperry, 3 F. Cas. 607 (C.C.D. Conn.
1843) (No. 1,503), and ordering a new trial in New York
in hopes of reaching consistent conclusions). And juries
also sometimes considered fact questions (though not
legal issues) in the rare revocation proceedings under the
1793 Act, Lemley, supra, at 1696-97, though the actual
practice generally involved a judge, not a jury, deciding
whether to revoke a patent. McGaw v. Bryan, 16 F. Cas.
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96, 97 (S.D.N.Y. 1821); Beauchamp, supra, at 20-22, 28-30
(discussing the 1792 case of Jenkins v. Folger).
The 1836 Patent Act narrowed the grounds for
a private party to bring an action to cancel a patent,
essentially limiting it to disputes between two parties
over which was the first inventor. Patent Act of 1836, ch.
357 § 16, 5 Stat. 117, 123–24. With that limitation, the
common assumption in the early 19 th century was that
only the government could bring a proceeding to cancel
or annul a patent. Lemley, supra, at 1699. And indeed the
government did so in a number of cases in the nineteenth
century. See, e.g., Mowry v. Whitney, 81 U.S. (14 Wall.)
434, 440 (1871); United States v. Am. Bell Tel. Co., 128
U.S. 315, 369 (1888). See also id. at 365-68 (canvassing
six prior cases in which the United States brought suit to
cancel a patent). 8
As one scholar summarizes the history:
Before 1870, in short, juries did resolve validity
questions when they were raised as a personal
defense in an infringement suit at law, just
as they did in England at common law. But
when courts considered whether to invalidate
a patent altogether during that period, they
did so at equity. After 1870, the use of juries
in patent cases essentially disappeared, and
judges took over not only the role of invalidating
8. This Court did say in McCormick Harvesting Mach. Co. v.
C. Aultman & Co., 169 US. 606, 609 (1898), that only courts were
vested with power to invalidate a patent. But that statement was
an interpretation of the then-applicable statute, Rev. Stat. §4916,
and did not purport to state a constitutional command.
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patents in revocation proceedings but also the
job of deciding personal defenses in patent
infringement suits. By 1940, the jury was a
forgotten memory in patent litigation; no one
living could recall a time when it was otherwise.
Lemley, supra, at 1704.
4. Throughout U.S. and English history, a jury in
an infringement action had no power to finally revoke a
patent. While accused infringers could assert a defense of
invalidity, and juries could decide the facts that underlay
that defense, that defense was personal to them; the
patent was not invalid unless it was nullified in a repeal
proceeding or revoked by the government. Patentees could
and did enforce “invalid” patents against others.
That ended in 1971. In Blonder-Tongue, 402 U.S. at
350, this Court held that the doctrine of collateral estoppel
extended to bar a patentee from asserting a patent held
invalid in one proceeding against any other defendant in a
subsequent case. This doctrine of “defensive non-mutual”
collateral estoppel represented a fundamental shift in
patent litigation. After Blonder-Tongue, a patentee puts
its legal right at risk every time it files a patent suit. Lose
on infringement and the patentee remains free to sue
someone else whose device works in a different way. But
lose on validity in one case and its rights of enforcement
end as to everyone else.
The result of Blonder-Tongue is that an invalidity
defense in litigation now looks more like the traditional
English revocation of a patent by the government (either
through the Privy Council or by consenting to a scire
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facias writ) than like a personal defense to infringement.
Indeed, this Court has recognized that infringement and
invalidity are now different proceedings with different
scopes because, after Blonder-Tongue, a ruling of
invalidity has a greater effect than simply defeating the
infringement case before the court. Cardinal Chem. Co.
v. Morton Int’l, Inc., 508 U.S. 83, 98 (1993).
If the ultimate question of validity had always been
tried to juries in the United States, this Court might
be reluctant to upset that practice even if the evidence
suggested that it wasn’t required in England before
1791. But in fact there is no such long tradition of juries
deciding validity in the United States. In the early days of
the Republic, juries sometimes decided specific fact issues
bearing on validity, though equity courts did so as well.
But juries did not invalidate patents in the modern sense
of Blonder-Tongue; nullity proceedings were brought
only in equity. Further, for most of the last 150 years,
including the time in which the modern requirements of
validity were developed and applied, judges, not juries,
decided those validity questions. Indeed, not until the
last generation have juries begun deciding validity in
a majority of cases or in circumstances that ended up
nullifying the patent. Lemley, supra at 1705-06. If the
Seventh Amendment is concerned with preserving the
fundamental essence of a right to jury trial as it existed
in history, it makes little sense to find such a right to exist
in a practice that was uncommon before 1978 and not truly
prevalent until the late 1980s.
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CONCLUSION
Inter par tes rev iew and other post -issuance
proceedings before the PTAB serve an important function
in insuring that the only exclusive rights in inventions that
exist are those that comply with the statutory conditions
Congress set forth to balance the needs of innovation and
free competition. To the extent that specific procedures
used in inter partes review require further refinement,
that task is for Congress, the Patent Office pursuant to
its delegated power, and perhaps the courts in resolving
appropriate statutory or due process challenges. Neither
Article III nor the Seventh Amendment warrants
abolishing the statutory scheme established by Congress
pursuant to its broad powers to determine the best means
for promoting the progress of the useful arts.
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